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. Adding to the complexity of operational control is the broad range of information that technology can deliver to the division commander. Technology allows the commander to expand his ability to view the battlefield and gather inputs from subordinate commanders and staff. The growing complexity makes it vital that the commander identify what information is important and clearly and concisely portray that information to his staff. With the increased importance of a clear and accurate vision, the G2, as head of the division intelligence effort, must ensure the commander is thoroughly grounded in the understanding of the opposition and of the environment in which the division will operate. Military intelligence doctrine provides for many different products and procedures to give the commander a baseline of information to develop his vision. The monograph will determine if current intelligence doctrine provides the commander with the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command as outlined in FM 3-0 (DRAG). The elements of operational design are introduced as part of visualization in the visualize, describe, and direct aspects of leadership. The elements of operational design are tools to aid in designing major operations and provide a linkage of ends, ways, and means. The monograph concludes that current intelligence doctrine does not provide the division commander the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command. The lack of clear identification of enemy centers of gravity prevents the commander from arraying the remaining elements of operational design to devise an effective operation to accomplish his endstate. Revisions of intelligence doctrine are necessary to fully support the commander and the provisions of FM 3-0. 
SUBJECT TERMS military operations other than war (MOOTW)
;
Introduction
What this task requires in the way of higher intellectual gifts is a sense of unity and a power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities which an ordinary mind would labor to identify and wear itself out in so doing.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War
The Environment A division commander operates in an environment of increasing complexity. A division can find itself in many forms of operations, frequently conducting these operations concurrently. A division could simultaneously be aiding U.S. agencies in fighting forest fires, preparing soldiers to conduct peace operations in Bosnia, and preparing to conduct a high intensity operation as part of a WARFIGHTER exercise. 1 In the future, the requirement for rapid response to crises and conflicts around the world will clearly be much greater than the need for static, territorial defense of central Europe. 2 These rapid responses will vary across the spectrum of engagements. With an upward trend in the number of deployments and the increased use of U.S. forces as part of peacekeeping and relief forces, a division in army can expect to operate in a very complex environment.
Adding to the complexity is the broad range of information that technology can deliver to the division commander. Technology allows the commander to expand his ability to view the battlefield and gather inputs from subordinate commanders and staff. The direction of the current revolution in military affairs points to the creation of a "system of systems" that literally encircles the earth and has global reach. 3 Divisions will be expected to operate effectively within this "system of systems" to reach their full capability. shows, 5 the size and intensity of engagements within the spectrum of conflict can range from peacetime military engagement (PME) to a major theater of war.
In times of war, the army must be able conduct offensive and defensive operations. It is also expected to be able to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations in MOOTW that will effectively promote peace and deter war. In addition, a division must be able to conduct support operations anywhere across the spectrum of war and MOOTW.
Within this spectrum, a commander must be prepared to perform any or all of the mission essential tasks (METL) the U.S. Army's leadership has identified as vital to performing the assigned mission. The Army Mission Essential Task List (METL) in FM 3-0 consists of the following critical capabilities:
• Close with and destroy enemy forces Commanders may be assigned any type of mission, from assisting local government officials in the United States with disaster relief, to full-scale combat operations deployed overseas. The expanding array of a division's potential missions further adds to the complexity facing today's division commander.
Technology also plays a role in the increasing complexity facing a 5 Ibid., 1-14. 
Military Intelligence Support
Effective command and control (C 2 ), equipment, facilities, intelligence and procedures provide commanders the support they require to visualize the situation, describe their vision to subordinates, and direct actions to implement their decision. As the situation becomes more complex, this support system must adapt to continue to provide the commander with the necessary information to be effective.
The mission of Army intelligence is to provide timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders across the range of military operations.
In war, IEW operations support the winning of battles and campaigns. In MOOTW, IEW operations support the promotion of peace, the resolution of conflict, and the deterrence of war. Across the spectrum, IEW operations reduce uncertainty and risk to US forces and permit the effective application of force. 8 With the increased importance of a clear and accurate vision, the G2, as head of the division intelligence effort, must ensure the commander is thoroughly grounded in his understanding of the opposition and of the environment in which he will lead his division. Current military intelligence doctrine provides for many different products and procedures designed to give the commander a baseline of information upon which to build his vision.
However, with the increase in complexity and scope of military operations, does current intelligence doctrine still ensure a complete picture is effectively presented to the commander?
Methodology
To answer the question, current and proposed military intelligence doctrine will be reviewed, focusing on identification of elements of information that are processed into intelligence and on procedures that are used for portraying intelligence so as to enhance the division commander's situational awareness. The review will examine the division G2 as the head of the division intelligence system and the job of intelligence in aiding the commander to effectively develop his elements of operational design.
The effectiveness of the division intelligence system in aiding the commander to visualize the situation will be evaluated based on the degree of support afforded by the system to the elements of operational design. As outlined in Chapter 5 of FM 3-0, the elements include: The operational elements listed have been either newly introduced in FM 3-0 or are redefined from those presented in FM 100-5 Operations, 1993. Each step in the doctrinal division intelligence process will be evaluated to determine how it addresses one of these elements. Due to the introduction of new terms, current doctrine may address elements of FM 3-0 without using the new terminology. For example, current doctrine uses the term 'high value targets" to designate a target vital to the enemy commander being able to accomplish his mission, while FM 3-0 defines that target as a "decisive points."
The results of the evaluation will then be used to determine whether current intelligence doctrine provides the commander with the necessary visualization of the battlefield 9 to effectively conduct battle command as outlined in FM 3-0 (DRAG) Chapter Two
Battle Command

Command
Command is the authority a commander in military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment. 10 The division commander exercises that authority to carry out his responsibility to accomplish all missions assigned to him and to the units subordinate to him.
Effective command entails use of the art of decision-making and of leading and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action that will impose the nation's will over the enemy and accomplish missions at the least expense in manpower and material.
Inserting an enemy into the situation creates a subset of command, battle command. Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking opponent. 11 The introduction of a hostile, creative opponent changes the issue of command for the division commander from one of simple problem solving to that of leadership in a dynamic situation. The commander must now outperform the opposition if he is to accomplish the mission. The requirement for leadership forms the basis for how a commander imposes his will on the enemy through the division's capabilities to accomplish the mission, and helps define his role in the division.
Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. The fluid nature of operations, of evolving technology, and of the volume of information increases the importance of the commander's ability to visualize and describe operations to subordinates and staff. 12 In spite of the increased capacity for technology to electronically connect commanders and staff elements, there remains a need for a shared understanding of the expected play of events during the battle as a common point of reference. The commander's vision creates the foundation for this common view to be expressed to the staff. members. 19 The issue for the division commander is to determine which elements of operational design from FM 3-0 apply to his situation. Although FM 3-0 states in the preface that it provides operational guidance for commanders from battalion through corps, which elements of operational design apply to the division commander?
Elements of Operational Design
A graphical model of the elements of operational design is shown in Figure 4 . Beginning with the specified tasks and mission from higher headquarters, the division commander must specify an endstate that sets the 18 Ibid., 5-6. 19 Ibid., 5-6. Attacks against decisive points may be spread out over time, leading to sequential operations for the division. They may also happen simultaneously, with each decisive point being attacked at the same time for maximum effect (See Figure 5) The design of the operation must take into account time and logistics to help determine the framework. Time determines the rate of tempo necessary for the commander to accomplish his mission within the requirements of his higher headquarters. If given a "no later than" time to reach his end state, the commander can backwards plan the operation to determine his required tempo.
that it derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. 22 Ibid., [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] Ibid., 5-9.
Combat power is the total means of destructive or disruptive force, or both, that a military unit or formation can apply against the adversary at a given time. 24 Logistics as an element of combat power plays a key part in several aspects of the overall design of an operation. Resupply requirements determine when a unit must halt, causing operational pauses that can seriously impact tempo. Logistics also plays a key part in determining the point where a unit will culminate during the battle. Culmination can occur for several reasons, including lack of combat power and logistical constraints. 25 The elements of operational design shown in figure 4 provide the commander a framework to organize his vision of the operation. After 24 Ibid.,4-2. 25 Units can also culminate before their mission is accomplished due to geographical constraints. A force oriented attack that is restricted by operational area boundaries would culminate before successful completion if the enemy escaped to where they could not be defeated. design. Knowing the overall framework, including decisive points and centers of gravity, subordinate commanders are then better prepared to exercise initiative. The commander's guidance emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how he intends to mass his combat power to accomplish the mission according to his higher commander's intent. The use of a vision-based intent employing the elements of operational design provides the staff with the picture of not only where to mass combat power, but also of the overall tempo and design of the operation.
Simultaneous and Sequential Operations
The commander forms his vision, the key to the entire operational design structure, early in the military decision-making process. The information he uses to form his vision comes from two sources: his own commander's estimate and the staff's estimate communicated to him through the mission analysis briefing.
Military intelligence provides the bulk of the mission analysis briefing.
The information and intelligence presented establish the framework for the commander's vision and provide the basis for the commander's guidance to the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS). Chapter three examines the doctrinal support from military intelligence to the division commander.
Chapter Three
Intelligence Doctrine
Intelligence Support to Military Operations The commander uses IPB to understand the battlefield and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. 33 Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield by: determining the threat's likely COA, describing the operating environment and defining the effects of the environment on the unit. 34 The commander is able to focus his forces through of his understanding of the geometry of the battle. He is aware of the factors of time, space, mass, and purpose of both his and the enemy's forces in the upcoming battle. The IPB process develops in the commander's mind the capabilities and potential courses of action available to the thinking opponent necessary for the commander to exercise battle command. The process consists of four steps: defining the battlefield environment, describing the battlefield effects, evaluating the threat, and determining threat COAs. 35 The first step in the IPB process is to define the battlefield environment. operation, rather than a laundry list of details about the area of operations.
The commander is spared having to pick and choose what details are important to the mission.
Step three in the IPB process is evaluating the threat. This step determines the threat force capabilities and the doctrinal principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures threat forces prefer to employ. 39 During this step accurate models of the enemy are developed to show how he normally operates.
A threat model should include:
• Standard graphical control measures At this point the enemy capabilities are portrayed in broad terms to guide further development. Within these capabilities, assets that the commander requires for the successful completion of the mission are identified as HVTs. 41 After HVTs have been identified as a whole, they are rank ordered with regard to their relative worth to the enemy's operations. 42 Once the enemy has been evaluated for capabilities, the last step of IPB is to identify and develop likely threat COAs that will influence accomplishment of the friendly mission. The G2 objective here is to replicate the set of COAs the enemy commander and staff are considering, including all COAs that will 38 Ibid., 2-10. 39 Ibid., 2-29. 40 Ibid., 2-29. 41 Ibid., 2-33.
influence the friendly command's mission, and identify those areas and activities that will discern which COA the threat commander has chosen. 43 By accomplishing this step, the G2 builds the products he will use to portray to the commander the thinking enemy he is fighting against.
Enemy COA development begins with identifying the enemy's likely objectives and desired end state. The G2 starts with the enemy command at least one level above his own and identifies likely objectives and the desired end state. The process is continued down two levels below the division, to enemy battalion level. 44 These objectives and end state are used to determine the full set of COAs.
To develop the full range of enemy COAs while eliminating those that don't affect the division, five criteria are used: suitability, feasibility, gravity, and decisive points.
• Evaluate how well each COA meets the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with doctrine.
• Evaluate how well each COA takes advantage of the battlefield environment.
• Compare each COA to the others and determine if the threat is more likely to prefer one over the others.
• Consider the possibility that the threat may choose the second or third "best" COA while attempting a deception operation portraying acceptance of the "best" COA • Analyze the threat's recent activity to determine if there are indications that one COA is already being adopted. 51
The enemy COAs are listed in order of relative probability of adoption. Any vulnerabilities identified in the enemy COAs are identified.
The completed enemy COAs are the final product of the initial IPB.
These COAs will continue to be updated as more intelligence is gathered during the operation. Once the initial IPB is complete, the information must be presented to the commander to have any significance.
Mission Analysis
Mission analysis occurs as step two of the military decision-making process. 52 Mission analysis is critical to ensure thorough understanding of the task and to direct subsequent planning. As a result of mission analysis, the tactical problem is defined and the process begun to determine feasible 51 Ibid., 2-44. This is first the mention of center of gravity and decisive points in FM 34-130. Center of Gravity is defined by FM 34-130 as the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends. That characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight. Decisive Point is defined as a point, usually geographical in nature, that, when retained, provides a commander with a marked advantage over his opponent. Decisive points could also include other physical elements such as enemy formation, command posts and communications nodes. 
Chapter Four
Analysis
To determine the effectiveness of the division intelligence system to aid the commander in visualization, the evaluation will be based on the degree of support afforded to the elements of operational design. To review, as outlined in The endstate defines for the commander a list of conditions to be achieved to consider his mission accomplished. The commander needs the staff to help him answer the question, "Can we achieve the endstate?" Through mission analysis, the staff begins the process by defining the tactical problem and determining feasible solutions. The commander must be able to visualize and describe to the staff and subordinate commanders the path he intends to follow to reach the endstate.
The commander arranges the elements of operational design in his mind to help him determine the direction the mission will take. These elements allow the CDR to visualize his path to the endstate within the constraints of time, space, and resources. The G2 provides the commander with a view of the enemy, their capabilities, vulnerabilities and courses of action taking into account the effects of the battlefield.
By showing what the enemy looks like and can accomplish to the commander, the G2 allows the commander to develop a realistic vision taking into account the enemy. The four steps of IPB combine to give the commander an accurate view of the battlefield, allowing him to determine an accurate endstate for the division that accomplishes the mission.
Center of Gravity Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. 56 The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of campaigns and major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the commander's intent and operational design. 57 More important, it forms the basis of the remaining elements of operational design. What is vital is a common understanding between the commander and the staff on what a center of gravity is and how it will be used to focus the command. Army doctrine addresses multiple centers of gravity vice a single center of gravity.
The challenge for the G2 is to help the commander develop his vision by presenting the enemy in a manner that shows how the enemy will interact with the division. Currently, the enemy is evaluated on the objectives of enemy units two levels higher and on capabilities and vulnerabilities. The IPB process addresses center of gravity only as criteria for prioritizing COAs. There is no 56 Ibid., 5-6 57 Ibid., 5-7.
coherent identification of center of gravity for the commander to concentrate his combat power in intelligence doctrine.
The lack of identification of center of gravity handicaps the commander in his view of how the enemy will fight, what's important to the enemy, and how to best defeat the enemy and his plan. The remaining items of operational design are handicapped because of a lack of identification of centers of gravity.
Lack of identification of COGs prevents coordinated and simultaneous actions on the enemy, piecemealing efforts against peripheral targets rather than focusing on what is important to the enemy.
Decisive Points A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. 58 Vulnerabilities are identified for the commander on where the enemy is susceptible to attack by the division. Enemy vulnerabilities are listed from the effects of peculiarities and weaknesses that result in opportunities that are exploitable at own, higher, or lower levels of command. 59 From this identification, the commander can direct which vulnerabilities are developed into COAs as part of his guidance to the staff. Decisive points are not centers of gravity, but are identified as keys to attacking or protecting centers of gravity.
Once identified and selected for action, decisive points become objectives. 60 Each COA focuses on hitting the enemy in a different set of vulnerabilities to bring about mission accomplishment.
As laid out in current intelligence doctrine, there is no focusing or attempt to link vulnerabilities together to overwhelm the enemy at a given place 
Lines of Operation
The directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. 61
The division commander functions within an area of operations (AO) assigned him by a higher headquarters. The AO is analyzed as part of the IPB step for defining the battlefield environment. If the division has not been assigned an AO, the G2 coordinates with the G3 to develop a recommendation for the commander on its limits. 62 The steps of IPB currently provide the division commander with an acceptable orientation to the lines of operation of the battlefield. The IPB analysis identifies the battlefield's environment, defines its effects, and arrays the battlefield in dimensions of time and space for the commander.
Culminating Point In the offense, the culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker's effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender's or the attacker's momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. The defensive culminating point marks that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force. 63 The issue of a culminating point for the division is addressed at the same Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively. Operational approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity. An operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination. 65 IPB lays out the terrain analysis and enemy analysis to help the commander with his time and space framework of the battlefield. This basic understanding is important to the commander as he looks across the battlefield operating systems (BOS) for the division to determine whether or not his unit has the operational reach to achieve the desired endstate.
IPB analysis should enable the commander to determine his operational approach, how he chooses to attack the enemy. Unfortunately, the enemy's center of gravity isn't identified for the commander during the IPB process.
Simultaneous and Sequential Operations
Army forces concurrently engage as many decisive points as possible. Simultaneity exploits depth and agility to overwhelm enemy forces. Sequential operations achieve the end state by phases. Commanders concentrate combat power at successive points over time, achieving the mission in a controlled series of steps. 66 The lack of identification of centers of gravity and the linkage with decisive points hampers the commander when he visualizes the sequencing of operations during his mission. The lack of linkage as he develops objectives from identified vulnerabilities and decisive points prevents him from synchronizing operations together to achieve the maximum effect. Not being able to focus effectively on the enemy, the commander is driven to a sequential organization of objectives for sake of phasing, going for organizational simplicity instead of maximum effect.
Nonlinear and Linear Operations
In nonlinear operations, maneuver units may operate in noncontiguous areas throughout the AO. In linear operations, maneuver units normally operate in contiguous AOs. 67 As IPB defines the battlefield environment, the linear or nonlinear nature of the battlefield will be evident from the area assigned to the division. There is a greater chance for nonlinear operations during stability and support missions because the lack of an enemy allows the spreading out of units for maximum effect with reduced risk.
Tempo The rate of military action. 68 The current IPB steps give the commander a good layout of the effects of terrain, weather and enemy forces. With this understanding and the conditions that make up his endstate, the commander can effectively get a feel for the required tempo for the mission.
66 Ibid., [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] Ibid., 5-11.,
Recommendations
Current doctrine fails to address the concept of center of gravity and identification of decisive points and objectives to attack the center of gravity adequately. In addition, it fails to address the enemy in terms of the elements of operational design, forcing the commander to apply two different standards of design for operations to evaluate his forces as compared to the enemy.
To prevent this, the doctrine on development of enemy courses of action should be modified to portray the enemy in terms of the elements of operational design. Specifically, the final step of IPB (determine threat courses of action)
could be modified to follow the following steps:
1. Determine the enemy's likely objectives and desired endstate 2. Identify Centers of Gravity 3. Determine Decisive Points and High Value Targets 4. Identify enemy Lines of Operation 5. Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows 6. Identify initial collection requirements
Step one remains identification of the threat's likely objectives and desired end state. The identification of an endstate shows what conditions the enemy will try to set to accomplish his mission and puts the actions he will be willing to take into the perspective of what he is trying to accomplish. The endstate can be stated as the task and purpose of the enemy, showing the mission assigned and the reason behind it.
Step two becomes the identification of centers of gravity for the enemy force. These centers of gravity become the basis for developing enemy course of action that take advantage of the strengths of the enemy force while protecting his vulnerabilities. All of the BOS systems of the enemy are still considered to 68 Ibid., [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] fully develop the COA, but the attention is focused on the centers of gravity to better appreciate the possible and probable enemy actions.
From the centers of gravity, enemy decisive points are determined in step three. These are refined as the commander shapes the friendly COAs with his guidance to the staff. Enemy vulnerabilities are determined in relation to these events on the battlefield and HVTs are developed to target these vulnerabilities.
The identification of decisive points allows the development of enemy 
Chapter Five
Conclusion
Current intelligence doctrine does not provide the commander the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command.
The lack of clear identification of enemy centers of gravity prevents the commander from arraying the remaining elements of operational design to design an effective operation to accomplish his endstate.
The concept of centers of gravity is the foundation for the elements of operational design. It focuses the commander on key enemy capabilities. To effectively use his division to accomplish the mission, the commander must provide a nucleus for all BOS elements to attack to overwhelm the enemy. An identified center of gravity provides the focal point for the division, allowing the commander to outline his operation using the elements of operational design.
Without this focal point, the commander is unable to effectively organize an operation. The inability to identify decisive points linked to a center of gravity prevents the commander from identifying a line of operations that produces simultaneity against key points. Without simultaneity, the operation defaults to a linear, sequential operation allowing the enemy to defeat the division piecemeal.
Intelligence doctrine does provide a clear picture of the dimensions of the battlefield and on the effects of terrain and weather on both friendly and enemy courses of action through the first two steps of IPB: 1) Define the battlefield environment, and 2) Describe the battlefield's effects. By including an entire step on describing the effects of weather and terrain on an operation, intelligence doctrine ensures the commander will "see the terrain" and its influence.
Intelligence doctrine lacks clear steps to distinguish how the opposing forces will interact on the battlefield because of the lack of identification of centers of gravity. Because centers of gravity are the source of power and movement, their protection and attack are the key pieces of an operation and need to be identified for the commander as part of military intelligence doctrine.
Appendix
Excerpted from FM 3-0, Chapter Five, Battle Command, DRAG Edition. 69 The Elements of Operational Design 5-1. A major operation begins with a designan idea that guides the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of the operation.
The operational d esign provides a conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. The elements of operational design are tools to aid designing major operations. They help commanders visualize the operation and shape their intent.
5-2. The elements of operational design are most useful in visualizing major operations. They help clarify and refine the v ision of operational-level commanders by providing a framework for them to describe operations in terms of task and purpose. They help commanders understand the complex combinations of combat power involved. However, their usefulness and applicability diminishes at each lower echelon. For example, senior tactical commanders must translate the operational commander's operational reach and culminating point into a limit of advance for ground forces. Decisive points become geographic or forceoriented objectives. Senior tactical commanders normally consider end state, decisive points and objectives, culminating point, simultaneous and s equential operations, linear and nonlinear operations, and tempo. 69 The following pages of FM 3-0, Operations, are provided to show the elements of design identified in the DRAG edition. Changes could occur in these elements as the FM develops into the final edition.
Elements of Operational Design
• Therefore, commanders at all levels monitor and assess progress toward the end state. Operational commanders continuously assess the major operation and campaign objectives against measures of effectiveness and the strategic end state.
5-5. Center of Gravity. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. The enemy will recognize and shield his center of gravity. Therefore, a direct approach may be costly and sometimes futile. Commanders examine many approaches, direct and indirect, to the enemy center of gravity.
5-6. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of campaigns and major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the commander's intent and operational design. Senior commanders describe the center of gravity in military terms, such as objectives and missions.
5-7. Commanders not only consider the enemy center of gravity, but also identify and protect their own center of gravity. During the Gulf War, for example, US Central Command identified the coalition itself as the friendly center of gravity. The combatant commander took measures to protect it, including deployment of theater missile defense systems. 5-8. Decisive Points and Objectives. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. Normally, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Part of operational art consists of selecting the decisive points that will most quickly and efficiently overcome the enemy center of gravity. Decisive points shape operational design and allow commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. 5-9. Some decisive points are geographic, for example, a port facility, transportation network or node, or base of operations. Other physical decisive points include elements of an enemy force, such as units, command posts, fire support units capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or important communications sites. Events, such as commitment of the enemy operational reserve, may also be decisive points. Once identified and selected for action, decisive points become objectives.
5-10. Decisive points may have a different character in support missions and stability operations. During hurricane relief efforts in Florida, for example, the Joint Task Force Andrew commander identified the reopening of public schools as a decisive point. This decisive point was physical in nature, but its real value was psychological. Reopening schools signaled to residents that they were on their way to recovery. 5-11. Lines of Operations. Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. In geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of the objective or defeat of the enemy force.
5-12. An operation may have single or multiple lines of operation. A single line of operations concentrates forces and simplifies planning. Multiple lines of operations increase flexibility and create several opportunities for success. Multiple lines of operations make it difficult for an enemy to determine the friendly objectives and force him to disperse resources against several possible threats. Each potential option further complicates the enemy's situation and stresses his C2 system. The strategic responsiveness and tactical agility of Army forces create opportunities for simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations. 5-13. Lines of operations may be either interior or exterior (see Figure 5 -2). A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the enemy force by shifting resources more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Operations on exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile enemy; however, they require stronger or more mobile forces.
5-14. The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. An enemy force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force; however, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force maneuvers to a position b etween larger but less agile enemy forces, the friendly force may defeat them in detail before they can react effectively. 5-16. Culminating Point. Culminating point has both operational and tactical relevance. In the offense, the culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker's effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender's or the attacker's momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. Beyond their culminating point, attackers risk counterattack and catastrophic defeat and continue the offense only at great peril. Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend successfully or counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defense. The defensive culminating point marks that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force. Commanders tailor their information requirements to anticipate culmination early enough to either avoid it or, if avoiding it is not possible, place the force in the strongest possible posture. 5-17. In operations where stability or support predominate, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. Operational culmination in a stability or support mission usually occurs when the force is spread too thinly to control the situation, from a lack of resources, or from the inability to supply resources when needed. Then small failures may cascade into larger defeats, shocks in the political arena, or inability to provide the necessary support.
5-18. Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses. Good operational d esign balances operational reach, operational approach, and operational pauses to ensure the force achieves its objectives before it culminates. Commanders carefully assess the physical and psychological condition of friendly and enemy forces, anticipate culmination, and plan operational pauses if necessary. They commit the required forces and conduct operational risk assessments. Commanders aim to extend operational reach while avoiding culmination and operational pauses.
5-19.
Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively. It is a tether. Operational reach varies based on the situation. Combat power, sustainment capabilities, and the geography surrounding and separating friendly and enemy forces all influence it. Army forces extend their operational reach by locating forces, reserves, bases, and support forward; by increasing the range of weapons systems; through supply discipline; and by improving lines of communications (LOCs).
5-20.
Operational approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity. The direct approach applies combat power directly against the enemy center of gravity or the enemy's principal strength. The indirect approach attacks the enemy center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that avoid enemy strengths. When possible, commanders choose an indirect approach: they maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and degrade enemy capabilities; they r efuse combat when the situation is unfavorable or the outcome does not significantly affect the operation. An effective operational approach, whether direct or indirect, focuses symmetric and asymmetric effects on the objective. By a shrewd operational approach, careful integration of joint capabilities, and a gile BOS combinations, Army forces bring enemies within their operational reach while protecting themselves.
5-21.
An operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination. An operational pause may occur because the force has culminated, because the character of the operation has changed (by the intervention of another enemy, for example), or through a combination of other factors. If the situation requires an operational pause, the commander should designate a new main effort. Army forces coordinate operational pauses with other components so the joint force can maintain the initiative and momentum.
5-22. Simultaneous and Sequential Operations. The sequence of operations is closely related to the use of resources. ARFOR commanders synchronize subordinate unit actions in time, space, and effects to link the theater strategy and design of joint major operations to tactical execution. Without this linkage, major operations deteriorate into haphazard battles and engagements that waste resources without achieving decisive results. 5-23. When possible, Army forces conduct simultaneous operations throughout the AO. They seek to employ combat power against the entire enemy system. Army forces concurrently engage as many decisive points as possible. Simultaneity exploits depth and agility to overwhelm enemy forces. It threatens opponents with immediate consequences throughout the AO. The presence of multiple threats overloads enemy C2 systems. Enemy commanders confront many decisions within a very short period. The chance of a serious mistake is high, and each mistake creates opportunities for friendly forces.
5-24. Simultaneous operations place a premium on information superiority and overwhelming combat power. In practical terms, the force size and force projection constraints may limit the ability of Army forces to achieve simultaneity. Effective operational designs employ complementary and reinforcing joint and service capabilities to achieve maximum simultaneity. 5-25. Sequential operations achieve the end state by phases. Commanders concentrate combat power at successive points over time, achieving the mission in a controlled series of steps. Often the scale and scope of the campaign or major operation, together with the resiliency of the enemy, compel commanders to destroy and disrupt the enemy in stages, exposing the center of gravity step by step. 5-26. Nonlinear and Linear Operations. Nonlinear operations are now more common than ever. Stability operations and support operations are normally nonlinear. Operation Just Cause and the last 36 hours of Operation Desert Storm featured large-scale nonlinear offensive operations. Ideally, a mobile defense transforms an enemy attack into a nonlinear operation that destroys him. 5-27. In nonlinear operations, maneuver units may operate in noncontiguous areas throughout the AO. Even when operating in contiguous AOs, maneuver forces may orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points. S imultaneity overwhelms opposing C2 and retains the initiative. Nonlinear operations proceed along multiple lines of operationsgeographic, logical, or both. LOCs often diverge from lines of operation, and sustaining operations may depend on CSS moving with maneuver units or delivered by air.
5-28. Smaller, lighter, more mobile, and more lethal forces sustained by efficient, distribution-based CSS systems lend themselves to simultaneous o perations against multiple decisive points. Situational understanding, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to maneuver against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive pointssupported by precise, concentrated fireinduces paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders. 5-29. In linear operations, maneuver units normally operate in contiguous AOs. Each combined arms force directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. The ratio of forces to space and the array of maneuver forces emphasize geographic position and tend to create a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT). This protects and simplifies LOCs. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of Army forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods. 5-30. A linear battlefield organization may be best for some o perations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily. Coalition operations may also require a linear design. 5-31. Nonlinear and linear operations are not mutually exclusive. Depending upon perspective and echelon, operations often combine them. For example, a corps may employ its forces in noncontiguous areas, operating simultaneously against multiple decisive points. A brigade combat team in the same corps operating within an urban area may employ units in a linear array. 5-32. Tempo. Tempo is the rate of military action. Controlling or altering that rate is necessary to retain the initiative. Army forces adjust tempo to maximize friendly capabilities. Commanders consider the timing of the effects achieved rather than the chronological application of combat power or capabilities. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. When the sustained friendly tempo exceeds the enemy's ability to react, friendly forces can maintain the initiative and have a marked advantage.
5-33. Commanders complement rapid tempo with three related concepts. First, operational design stresses simultaneous operations rather than a d eliberate sequence of operations. Second, an operation may achieve rapid tempo by avoiding needless combat. This includes bypassing resistance that appears at times and places commanders do not consider decisive. Third, the design gives maximum latitude to independent action and initiative by subordinate commanders.
5-34. Army forces generally pay a price for rapid tempo through greater f atigue and resource expenditure. Commanders judge the capacity of their forces to operate at high tempo based on theater resources and deteriorating friendly performance. They design the operation for various tempos that take into account the endurance of the force.
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